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CRIMINOLOGY
THE POLICE INTERNAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE IN NEW YORK CITY
BERNARD COHEN*
THE POLICE JUSTICE SYSTEM
There have been many studies of the criminal
justice system in this country.' The data used in
these studies usually pertain to crimes or criminals
and how they progress through the police, court
and correctional agencies.
Knowledge of the criminal justice system, al-
though useful for many purposes, tells us little
about police officers who violate the law. One
reason for this is that police departments operate
their own internal judicial system, which is in
many ways independent of the civil courts. Police
officers who break the law will rarely be processed
by the civil criminal justice system unless the
police choose to investigate the crime and report
it to civil authorities. This is true whether the
officer's actions occurred in the performance of
his duty or not. Alternatively, the police may
dismiss charges of misconduct by officers or proc-
ess them by departmental trials.
This research is a summary of what we have
been able to determine about police misconduct
and the operations of the police justice system
from data which were collected for a broader
study of selection, assignment, promotion, and
reward procedures in the New York City Police
Department. For this study we have utilized a
cohort consisting of all officers who were appointed
to the Department in 1957. The present analysis
concerns the recorded allegations of misconduct
for the 1,915 men in this cohort.2 These recorded
allegations are followed through the police justice
* M.A., Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania. Asso-
date Professor of Sociology, Queens College, City Uni-
versity of New York.
Professor Cohen is the Journal's book review editor.
This study was sponsored by the City of New York
and by the New York City-Rand Institute. Its con-
tents, however, do not purport to represent the official
views or policy of either the City of New York or the
Institute.
1 A review of some of these studies appears in M. E.
WOL GANG & B. COiHN, CTRsM AND RACE 66-88
(1970).
2 Twenty-six officers were excluded from our analysis
because their race was unknown.
system in order to determine which offenses were
brought to departmental trial and which were
dropped. Then the final dispositions of those
brought to trial are examined. 3
DATA SOURCES
Our data on complaints come primarily from
the Public Morals Section, the Chief Inspector's
Investigating Unit, the Civilian Complaint Re-
view Board and the Disciplinary Record Section.
These Units are empowered to record and investi-
gate all forms of police misconduct including de-
prtmental complaints, complaints characterizable
as corruption and civilian complaints. During the
latter part of 1968 and in 1969, a research team
visited these units and gathered all allegations of
misbehavior which were on record for the cohort
of officers who were appointed in 1957.
Reports of police misconduct initially come to
the attention of the investigating units in many
ways. Some result from citizen complaints and
reach the units through channels. Others are
reported by departmental commanders or fellow
police officers. Some' investigations are initiated
as a result of surveillance of certain officers for
disciplinary control. Finally, unit investigators
may see a violation while observing patrol prac-
tices or during periodic inspections of precinct
activities.
DEScRIPTION oF Tx TYPE OF
CoMPL nrs AN DisPosrIoNs
The charges which appeared on the records we
examined ranged from minor violations such as
absent from post to more serious complaints
involving acceptance of gratuities, the use of
unnecessary force, etc. At the time they are first
recorded, these complaints represent allegations
3A detailed discussion of our overall research plan
and methodology will be described in a forthcoming
work on selection, assignment, promotion, and reward
procedures. We will, however, discuss briefly the types
and sources of data used for an analysis of complaints
against members of the police department.
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of misconduct; they are not formal charges arising
from an investigation. We grouped the complaints
into three categories: departmental complaints,
criminal charges and civilian complaints.
Civilian complaints are those which must be
disposed of by the Civilian Complaint Review
Board according to the Department's Rules and
Procedures. These complaints almost always in-
volved allegations of unnecessary force, abuse of
authority, discourteous behavior and ethnic slurs.
According to our definition, civilian complaints do
not necessarily have to be initiated by civilians,
though they always involve civilians. In fact,
in a few instances, police officers while on duty
initiated civilian complaints in behalf of civilians
against fellow officers.
Complaints which do not involve unnecessary
force, abuse of authority, discourtesy or ethnic
slurs, but are in violation of the New York State
Penal Code, were grouped as criminal charges.
These complaints may be reported either by
civilians or 1olice personnel and are handled
internally by the Department's investigation units.
Some typical examples are gambling, consorting
with criminals, acceptance of gratuities and
burglary.
All other complaints, mainly those which vio-
late departmental regulations and procedures or
result in disruption of the internal organization
of the department, were classified as departmental
complaints. These complaints were usually ini-
tiated by commanding officers or supervisory
personnel.4 Examples of these violations include
sleeping while on duty, losing a shield, insubordi-
nation and drunkenness while on duty and pro-
test summons.5
Our classification of charges into three cate-
gories was done to facilitate analysis and does
not represent any formal labelling of charges by
the Department. In some cases it was necessary
to make judgments about how to classify the
IIt should be made clear that both departmental
and criminal charges can be, ahd often are, initiated
by civilians.
5Protest Summons arises when a complainant, sub-
sequent to receiving a summons for an offense-usually
a minor one-protests the actions taken by the officer.
In many cases, the complainant also protested the
basis for receiving the complaint. Typical complaints
were that the officer made a false arrest, or conducted
an illegal search of house or person. Other times, the
complainant maintained he was taken into an RMP
car without apparent reason and detained unjustifia-
bly in a station house. In one case, the person protested
the summons because some of his property was missing.
complaints, and no claim is made that our choice
is the only way this could have been done.
Dispositions
Detailed procedures for processing departmen-
tal, criminal, and civilian complaints are outlined
in the New York City Police Department Rules
and Procedures and need not be repeated here.'
Some examples of the dispositions taken by the
police department however will help interpret our
findings which appear later in this study.
" Complaint Dismissed-The complaint is re-
viewed and unsubstantiated on its merits.
It is dismissed.
" Filed-The complaint is filed because the
complainants refuse to submit to interview;
or the c6mplaint is filed because of absence
of evidence or witnesses.
" Complainant Uncooperative---The complain-
ant refuses to cooperate.
" Minor Fine--A fine of less than 10 days'
pay or vacation.
* Major Fine--A fine equal to 10 or more days'
pay or vacation.
" Suspended-The officer is suspended from
the force for a specified period of time.
" Probation-The officer is placed on probation
for a specific period of time.
" Dismissed-The officer is dismissed from the
force.
DESCRIPTON OF TIM COHORT:
AcTmvEs AND INACTIVES
The group of police officers which was studied
consists of 1,915 men who were appointed to the
police department in 1957. Most of these men
(1,608) are still members of the force and comprise
our active cohort. An additional 307 men left the
force during the past eleven years and are referred
to hereafter as "inactives."
This particular cohort was selected primarily
for two reasons. First, the eleven-year period
between 1957 and the time the data were collected
was suitably long to enable us to discern the
career paths available to officers in the Depart-
ment. Second, it yielded an adequate number of
officers in our sample so that we might study
subgroups.
In our description of the incidence of complaints
against officers, we consider only the active mem-
6 PoLicE DEPARTMENT, CITY Op NEw YORK RuLEs
ANi PRocEDURzs ch. 21 (charges and trials).
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bers of the cohort, since otherwise we would be
attempting to compare charges accumulated over
different periods of time. However, a detailed
comparison of the incidence of allegations against
inactives and actives is undertaken in another
paper. An advantage of using only the actives is
that we can determine the extent and variety of
alleged misconduct which the Department will
tolerate and still permit a man to remain on the
force.
When we proceed to an analysis of what happens
to complaints as they are processed by the police
justice system, we naturally include allegations
against inactives as well as actives, since one
would expect to find the officers who had exper-
ienced the most severe discipline among the in-
actives.
INCIDENCE OF CoarLImNTs AGAINST OFFICERS
Our data provide us with the number of com-
plaints against each officer in the cohort and the
type of each complaint. When these data are
aggregated for all the members of the cohort,
we obtain a distribution from which one can
determine the average number of complaints
experienced over eleven years and also the chances
of having an extremely large or small number of
complaints.
Our findings on the incidence of complaints
are summarized in Table I. They reveal that
41.7 percent of the active officers had no complaints
against them during their eleven years on the force,
while 58 percent incurred at least one complaint.
We see also that nearly a third of the men (30.6
percent) received 2 or more complaints. Thus,
about half of those with at least one complaint
went on to incur another. Half of these (260 men,
or 16 percent of the cohort) received at least 3
complaints. The highest number of complaints
recorded for a single officer in our cohort was 16,
but 5 or more charges can be considered extremely
rare, since 95 percent of the men had fewer than
5. However, it is noteworthy that an officer can
accumulate as many as 16 complaints and still
iemain on the force.
Our data also show that blacks received more
BLE I




Black White Puerto Rican Total
N % N % N % N %
0 21 21.2 638 43.0 11 .44.0 670 41.7
1 29 29.3 410 27.6 9 36.0 448 27.9
2 23 23.2 204 13.7 1 4.0 228 14.2
3 12 12.1 106 7.1 1 4.0 119 7.4
4 7 7.1 54 3.6 2 8.0 63 3.9
5 4 4.0 33 2.2 1 4.0 38 2.4
6 1 1.0 16 1.1 17 1.1
7 1 1.0 8 0.5 9 0.6
8 1 1.0 5 0.3 6 0.4
9 2 0.1 2 0.1
10 1 0.1 1 0.1
11 3 0.2 3 0.2




16 1 .1 1 .1
Unknown 2 .1 2 .1
Total Men 99 100.0 1484 100.0 25 100.0 1608 100.0
Total Charges 180 1798 27 2005
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TABLE II
DEPArTMENTAL, CRaNAL AND CiAw CO-iPLAINTS BY RACE iOR TE COHORT Or AcTIVE O ricERs APPOINTED
IN 1957 (PERCENTAGES & MEANS)
Race
Type of Complaint
Black White Puerto Rican Total
N % .2 N % X N % I N % 2
Departmental........ 126 71.2 (1.3) 1095 63.1 (0.7) 20 76.9 (0.8) 1241 64.0 (0.8)
Criminal ............. 13 7.3 (0.1) 169 9.7 (0.1) 3 11.5 (0.1) 185 9.5 (0.1)
Civilian Complaints.... 38 21.5 (0.4) 471 27.1 (0.3) 3 11.5 (0.1) 512 26.4 (0.3)
Total Charges* ....... 177 100.0 1735 100.0 26 100.0 1938 100.0
Number of Officers .... (99) (1484) (25) (1608)
* These totals differ slightly from those in Table I because our method of collecting data did not permit us to
record, for 67 complaints (mostly departmental), the precise type of charge, whether it was brought to trial, or
the disposition. These complaints were all registered against men who had more than 4 charges and constitute 3
percent of the total number of complaints.
** X indicates the mean, or average, number of complaints per man.
complaints than whites, and whites more than
Puerto Ricans, though in each racial group the
majority of officers experienced at least one com-
plaint. Nearly 80 percent of the black officers
received at least one complaint, compared to only
57 percent of the whites and 56 percent of the
Puerto Ricans. Also, on the average, each black
officer incurred 1.8 complaints, compared to 1.2
for the white and 1.1 for the Puerto Rican officers.
The difference in rates of repeating complaints
also varied by race. Nearly half of the black
officers (49.5 percent) incurred at least two charges
each, compared to about a third of the whites
(29.4 percent) and a fifth of the Puerto Ricans
(20 percent). Further, 63 percent of the black
officers with at least one charge received another,
compared to 48 percent and 36 percent respectively
for whites and Puerto Ricans.
Although the data could be interpreted as
showing that either blacks engage in misconduct
more frequently than others or they have a higher
proportion of their misconduct reported, neither
of these interpretations is necessarily correct.
In fact, the number of charges against officers
varies with their assignment, and, as our data
indicate, blacks receive a disproportionate number
of assignments in special units where all officers,
regardless of their race, are more likely to receive
complaints.7 The general volume of allegations of
7 For instance, men in plainclothes assignments are
particularly susceptible to complaints. By the second
assignment, four times as many blacks (12 percent)
as whites (3 percent) in our cohort performed plain-
clothes duties.
misconduct indicated by the data :is more signifi-
cant than the differences among the races.
Type of Complaint
It is important to recall that some complaints
are for minor violations of departmental regula-
tions, so that the figures shown on Table I are
not indicative of widespread corruption or criminal
behavior by police officers. Nor is this suggested
when the data are classified by type: departmental
violations, criminal charges, and civilian com-
plaints. The details are shown in Table II.
Our data show that well over half of the com-
plaints were for departmental violations, with
the next largest category being civilian complaints.
Only 185 of the 1,938 charges for which we knew
the type were allegations of criminal activities.
Examination by race reveals that 71 percentof
the complaints against black officers were depart-
mental compared to 63 percent for whites. Also,
the average number of departmental charges was
nearly twice as high for black as for white or
Puerto Rican officers (1.3 compared to .7 and .8
respectively). On the other hand, the average
number of criminal charges was equal for the
officers regardless of race (.1), while differences
in the proportion of civilian complaints were
extremely small (.4 for blacks and .3 for whites
respectively-there were only 3 civilian com-
plaints against Puerto Ricans). Thus, the relatively
high incidence of offenses for blacks is almost
entirely accounted for by a greater number of
BERNARD COHEN
, TABLE III
DEPARTMENTAL, CRIMINAL AND CivILIN ComPLAINS BY TYPE AND RACE FOR COHORT OF ACTIVE OFpICERS
APPOnTED IN 1957
Race
Type of Complaint B White - Puerto R
flack White Puerto Rican Total
Procedural ...................................
Insubordination ......................... ....
Absence (AW OL) .. ........... ...........
Sick Absences ................................
M oonlighting ................ ...........
Failure to Safeguard Guns ................
Failure to Safeguard Property ...............
Inappropriate Behavior Off Duty ...............
Inappropriate Behavior On Duty ...........
Fail to Perform Duty .....................
M oral Turpitude ........................ ..
Purposely Falsifying Report ..................




Protest Summons ....... .............
Police Negligence ............................
Fail to Pay Debts . .........................
Consorting with Criminals ....................
Gratuities..... .. ..........................
Gambling or Policy Operations .................
False Testimony ......................
Criminal Offense (8 Codes) ....................
Criminal Offense (Other) ......................
Unnecessary Force .............. ............
Discourtesy ........ .................
Abuse of Authority . ........................
Ethnic Slurs.. ...........................















Total ................................... 177 100.0 1,735 1 100.0 26 100.0 11,938 100.0
departmental charges, rather than criminal charges
or civilian complaints.
A more detailed breakdown of complaints is
given in Table III. The category with the highest
proportion of charges is absences (21.1 percent).
Other categories with a substantial number of
complaints include unneccessary force (13.6 per-
cent), protest summons (11.2 percent), abuse of
authority (7.8 percent), police negligence (7.0
percent) and gratuities (5.7 percent). There were
few complaints for gambling (.4 percent) or con-
sorting with criminals (.7 percent) and not one
recorded instance of collusion in narcotics opera-
tions.
In general, the types of complaints against
white and black officers were similar. The only
substantial differences were for absences, failure
to safeguard guns, failure to safeguard property,
and protest summons. The black rate was twice
as high for absences and protest summons (.2 to
.1 for protest summons and .4 to .2 for absences)
while it was three times greater for failure to
safeguard property and guns (.1 to .03).
Detectives
Since detectives are specially selected by the
Detective Division and are subject to different
administrative controls from those applied to
[Vol. 6
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TABLE IV
DEPARTMENTAL, CRIMINAL AND CrvIiAN COMPLA=NTS BY RACE FOR DETECTIVES (PERCENTAGES AND MEANs)
Race
Type of Complaint
Black White Puerto Rican Total
N % S N % S N % S N % S
Departmental ...... 25 55.6 (1.0) 112 51.1 (0.5) 9 64.3 (1.0) 146 52.5 (0.6)
Criminal ........... 5 11.1 (0.2) 37 16.9 (0.2) 3 21.4 (0.3) 45 16.2 (0.2)
Civilian ........... 15 33.3 (0.6) 70 32.0 (0.3) 2 14.3 (0.2) 87 31.3 (0.3)
Total .............. 45 100.0 (1.7) 219 100.0 (1.0) 14 100.0 (1.3) 278 100.0 (1.1)
Number of Detec-
tives ............ 27 218 11 256
uniformed officers, one might suspect that their
patterns of charges would differ. We found, how-
ever, that the total incidence of charges for these
men over the eleven-year period (i.e., both before
and after they became detectives) was nearly the
same as for non-detectives. In fact, the average
number of complaints for detectives and non-
detectives were 1.1 and 1.2 respectively (see
Tables II and IV).
When broken down by type of complaint, the
incidence of departmental violations was nearly
equal (.6 for detectives and .8 for non-detectives)
while no difference appeared for civilian complaints
(.3 for both). Tie only significant difference be-
tween the two groups occurred for criminal
charges. The rate of criminal allegations against
detectives (.2) was twice as high as the corresponding
rate for nwn-detectives (.1). Our data also show
that the differences resulted primarily from
gratuities and the more serious index offenses.
Though there are only one-fifth as many detectives
as non-detectives, they account for nearly one-
third of the allegations concerning gratuities (32
for detectives, 78 for non-detectives) and other
criminal offenses (8 for detectives and 20 for non-
detectives). Further details are shown on Table IV.
Actual Incidence of Misconduct
Just as arrest figures do not accurately measure
the extent of crime among civilians, the data
concerning charges against officers is not a true
measure of police misconduct. On the one hand,
some of the officers may not have been guilty of
the offense appearing in the complaint. On the
other hand, some misconduct may not have been
recorded. Thus the figures reported above may be
either higher or lower than the true incidence of
misconduct.
Instances of misconduct may fail to appear in
our data for perfectly legitimate reasons or be-
cause of inadequacies in the police system of
justice. For example, certain records of misconduct
are destroyed after a specified period of time in
accordance with regulations; these are for minor
departmental violations.
Other possible reasons for the absence of records
of misconduct, which our data can neither confirm
nor deny, are the following:
The investigative machinery available to the
police department may be inadequate to un-
cover many offenses.
An "informal system of sanctions may exist to
punish officers guilty of misconduct without
making an entry on the record. For example,
changes in the time or location of an officer's
assignment can be used as informal sanctions.
Evidence of misconduct may not be pursued
by those having the responsibility to report
such evidence.
In any event, the number of recorded charges
for criminal activities is not substantial enough to
provide any evidence of widespread corruption
in the New York City Police Department. Never-
theless, the frequency of recorded complaints in
the official records is high enough to consider the
possibility of different forms of deviant subcultures
among police officers.5
Summary of Incidence Data
* Fifty-eight percent of the police officers in
our cohort received at least one complaint.
* Blacks exhibited the highest incidence of
'In the present study, at least three of these might
include a police subculture of violence, a subculture of
theft and a subculture of stolidity. Further elaboration
of these subcultures will appear in a later paper.
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complaints, with whites next, and then
Puerto Ricans. However, the differences
among races are almost entirely accounted
for by differences in departmental violations,
rather than in criminal charges or civilian
complaints.
o Most of the complaints were departmental
violations (64 percent).
" A significant proportion of recorded allega-
tions of misconduct involved civilian com-
plaints (26 percent).
" One hundred thirty-one complaints charac-
terizable as corruption were recorded against
1,608 officers in eleven years.
" The total incidence of complaints was equal
for detectives and non-detectives, but de-
tectives had a greater proportion of charges
that may be characterized as corruption.
PoLIcE JUSTICE
Our data describe not only the nature of each
charge brought against an officer in our cohort,
but also the manner in which it was processed by
the police justice system. Such information illu-
minates the extent to which charges are found to
be valid and also reveals where the police place
their emphasis in prosecuting charges. For this
analysis, we use data about all charges brought
against inactive as well as active officers, so the
incidence of charges differs slightly from that
shown in the preceding section.
The most serious limitation of our data occurs
for the men who were dismissed from the Depart-
ment. For various reasons, their files may not be
retained in the same locations as those of the
other inactive officers. Especially in cases where
an officer is dismissed prior to completion of a
departmental trial (e.g., if he is indicted by a
grand jury), we may have no record of the dis-
position of his case.
A special search by the Personnel Record Unit,
conducted at our request, revealed that twenty-
eight members of the 1957 cohort were dismissed.
For only five of them do we have the record of a
departmental trial resulting in dismissal.
Cases Brought to Trial
As shown in Figure 1, approximately 59 percent
of departmental violations against members of our
cohort were brought to trial, compared to 15 percent
of allegations of criminal misconduct brought to
departmental trial. Considering the fact that de-
partmental violations are usually reported by
superior officers, while criminal allegations may
be anonymous or otherwise insubstantial, it is
not surprising to find a larger proportion of the
former brought to trial. However, under the
reasonable assumption that charges arising from
independent probes by the Department's own
investigatory units would be strong enough to
come to trial, the data indicate that these units
press fewer than two criminal charges per thou-
sand men per year. The police justice system
succeeds in detecting and bringing to trial a much
larger number of alleged violations of the Depart-
ment's rules and procedures.
Civilian complaints cannot properly be separated
according to which of them were brought to trial,
since every civilian complaint is investigated,
evaluated, and adjudicated by the Civilian Com-
plaint Review Board. It is necessary to examine
the dispositions of this type of misconduct.
.pisposition
The data show that very few charges of any type
resulted in serious punishment. The majority of
departmental violations received minor finesg (63
percent) while major fines were given in 22 (3
percent) of the cases. In only 8 cases (1 percent)
were men suspended. Four men in our cohort
were dismissed from the Department.0 Approxi-
mately 10 percent of the complaints were dis-
missed, 9 percent resulted in reprimands, while
1 percent received probation.
Dispositions for criminal charges are more
difficult to interpret because of the small number
(31 out of a total of 204) brought to trial. One of
the men was reprimanded, one was placed on
probation and six had their complaints dismissed.
Nine men were fined, five of whom received major
fines. Only 5 of the 1,915 men were suspended for
criminal charges during the eleven-year period
on the force. Most of the remaining cases were
filed (5).
The dispositions for crimes that may be charac-
terized as corruption were analyzed separately.
Our data show that 121 gratuity charges, 7 gam-
bling charges and 16 charges of consorting with
criminals were recorded. Out of these, 23 cases
(16 percent) were brought to trial. Three cases
9 See text accompanying note 6 supra for definitions
of minor and major fines.
10 This figure would presumably change to 28 men
dismissed after the update conducted by the Police
Department.
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of consorting with criminals, and 1 case each of
gambling and gratuities received the two most
severe penalties of "major fine" and "suspension."
The remainder of the 23 cases (18) received dis-
positions of complaint dismissed, reprimand, pro-
bation, filed and minor fine. Three cases of gratu-
ities resulted in a minor fine, but none received
a major one. (Two cases were filed and 2 cases
fell into the "unknown" category.)
The remaining criminal cases, most of which
consisted of burglary, larceny and minor assault,
show similar patterns. Of 54 major and minor
offenses, 5 were brought to trial, with 2 resulting
in a major fine and 1 a suspension. One complaint
was dismissed and in one the disposition was
unknown. Three cases of false testimony were
brought to trial. Two resulted in major fines and
1 a minor fine.
During the entire 11-year period covered by
this study, civilian complaints were investigated
and disposed of by members or representatives
of the Civilian Complaint Review Board which
includes police officers. Our cohort of men ex-
perienced the Board during the years of civilian
control as well as the period during which the
Board was operated by the police.
There were 541 civilian complaints with a
little more than half (280) involving unnecessary
force. Abuse of authority was next with 160 com-
plaints, 92 complaints involved discourteous be-
havior, while there were 9 instances of ethnic
slurs. Approximately 85 percent (449) of all civilian
complaints were dismissed or filed." (The same
proportion holds for complaints of unnecessary
force (241 out of 280).) In 17 cases, conciliations
were effected between officer and complainant.
In 21 cases (4 percent) officers were found guilty.
Eleven of the officers received instructions, five
were admonished and one was reprimanded.
Charges and specifications were brought in 4
instances (or less than 1 percent of the total cases);
one case resulted in a major fine, while in the
other 3 cases the disposition was unknown. All
four of these cases involved allegations of un-
necessary force.1 2
11 Exactly 51.6 percent were dismissed and 31.4 per-
cent filed.
12 A detailed breakdown of the disposition of other
types of civilian complaints is as follows: 5 cases of un-
necessary force received instruction and 6 resulted in
conciliation between officer and complainant. In cases
involving abuse of authority, 96 percent resulted in no
penalty while warnings and/or instructions were given
in 5 cases. Conciliation was effected in 3 cases. Like-
The absence of severe penalties in instances
involving civilian complaints is repeated in cases
where citizens "protest summons." This offense
was designated a departmental violation because
it was usually recorded by the Bureau of Public
Morals or the Chief Inspector's Investigation
Unit, but was not processed as a civilian complaint
by the Civilian Complaint Review Board. Most
cases of "protest summons," however, were ini-
tiated by civilians. Moreover, in many cases the
officer's personal behavior as well as the legitimacy
of the offense was called into question. In any
event, none of the men involved in the 230 cases of
"protest summons" were brought to trial.
The Informal System of Justice
Our data, which come mainly from official
records of the disciplinary and investigatory units
of the Department, reflect the formal structure
of police justice and require careful interpretation.
One major limitation is that our data do not capture
directly the informal system of punishments and
rewards that presumably exists side by side with the
formal system. The fact that a civilian, criminal, or
departmental complaint is not brought to trial does
not necessarily mean that no punishment is inflicted.
Punishments ranging from verbal sanctions to
reassignment may be applied. In serious instances,
especially when evidence is difficult to obtain,
officers might even be forced to resign without any
official documentation being made of this action.
In any case, our data do not directly reflect the
existence or incidence of these informal sanctions
nor do they indicate the effectiveness of such
procedures, should they exist.
Certain inferences can be made from some of
our data, however, regarding the informal system
of justice. Should resignation in lieu of trial be
either permitted or encouraged by the Depart-
ment, we would expect the inactives to have much
more serious disciplinary records than their active
counterparts. Our analysis of the inactives showed
this not to be the case. Only 30 percent of the
inactive officers bad charges recorded against them
compared to 58 percent of the actives, and the
average number of charges among inactive officers
wise in only 6 out of 90 cases where discourteous be-
haviour resulted did officers receive even a warning,
reprimand or instruction. Seven cases resulted in recon-
ciliation between the officer and complainant. One of
nine known dispositions for ethnic slurs resulted in in-
struction while the others were either dismissed (2),
filed (4), or conciliated (1). In one the disposition was
unknown.
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was .6 compared to 1.3 for the active officers.
The difference is explained by the shorter tenure
of inactives in the Department (averaging 3.7
years) and the fact that about half of all charges
were incurred during the first 4 years on the
force." Thus, the history of charges for the inac-
tives is about the same as for the actives.
The results of our analysis also show that the
proportion of charges which were for criminal
complaints are almost identical for actives and
inactives, while the actives had a higher pro-
portion of civilian complaints and a lower pro-
portion of departmental charges than inactives.
These data fail to support the argument that many
men resigned involuntarily from the Department
because they were threatened with the more
serious charges involving corruption, brutality,
or other forms of criminal behavior.
The notion that the presence of charges on an
officer's record might prevent him from obtaining
certain desirable assignments is not entirely sup-
ported by our data. In fact, as we shall report
elsewhere, in the case of appointment to the
Detective Division our preliminary analysis
showed that unsuccessful applicants did not have
more criminal allegations than successful appli-
cants prior to their appointment. We have sim-
ilarly been unable to find evidence in our data
that men are reassigned out of units such as the
Detective Division as a consequence of accumu-
lating charges.
Other aspects of the informal system of justice
in the Department deserve future attention. We
discuss some of them in the final section of this
paper.
Detectives and Non-Detectives
Are detectives treated differently from their
uniformed counterparts by the police justice sys-
tem? Because detectives comprise the elite of
the Department and are recruited mainly from
the rank of plainclothes units, some of which
conduct internal investigations, it might be ex-
pected that they are treated less severely by
police justice. This would be reflected in few
instances of alleged misconduct brought to trial,
and less severe dispositions. 4
13The fraction of charges occurring in each year
could only be determined from our data for those
charges which were brought to trial.
"On the other hand, they may be treated more
severely because they might be held to higher standards
than the uniformed force.
The data in Figure 2 show how charges were
processed for men who eventually became detec-
tives. These data cover the entire eleven-year
history of these men, but since most of them
spent at least seven of the eleven years in speci-
alized units, the data apply mostly to the period
of time when they were not in uniform. The data
show that 4 percent of criminal charges against
detectives were brought to trial. This is less than a
third of the corresponding number for non-detectives
(14 percent).
Moreover, 34 percent of departmental violations
by detectives were brought to trial compared to 60
percent for non-detectives.
The data on final dispositions show that of two
detectives brought to trial for criminal charges,
one had his charge dismissed and the other was
suspended. Thus, for an eleven-year period only
1 out of 256 detectives was punished for criminal
charges.
A similar pattern is discernible for civilian
complaints. Ninety-one percent of complaints
against detectives were either dismissed or filed
(this compares to 82 percent for non-detectives).
In one case (unnecessary force), an officer received
instruction, while in seven, we were unable to
determine the final disposition.
As with non-detectives, departmental violations
received the most severe dispositions. Exactly 27
detectives were fined, all of whom received minor
ones. Another eight men were reprimanded. In 11
of the cases, the charges were dismissed while 2
cases were filed. No detective was placed on pro-
bation.
In conclusion it is less likely for charges against
detectives to be brought to departmental trial than is
the case for their uniformed counterparts. This is
especially true for charges characterizable as corrup-
tion, where only 2 out of 37 cases (5 percent) were
brought to trial compared to 14 (16 percent) for
non-detectives.
Police Justice aid Race
We know from several recent National Com-
missions convened to study crime, riots and
violence, as well as from studies of selected areas
that black citizens are more likely to be stopped
on suspicion, interrogated, searched and arrested
than their white counterparts' 5 Moreover, they
"s See PREsmENT's ComrrssioN ox LAW ENzoRcE-
mENT AmD ADINISTRATION or JusTicE, THE CHAL.-
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The Police Justice System: Detectives and Non-Detectives. 1608 Active Officers Appointed in 1957.
are likely te be treated more severely by the courts.
Are there similar differences between the races
in the way in which the police justice system
DENT'S COMaISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
mINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, To ESTABLISH JUSTICE,
To ENSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY (1969); REPORT
or T NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS (1968); WOLFGANG & COHEN, supra note
1.
handles officers who violate the law or depart-
mental rules?
In general, our data showed few differences in
the proportion of complaints brought to trial or
their dispositions for members of the different
races. The data are shown in Figure 3. Sixty
percent of the black officers were brought to trial
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mately 57 percent of the white officers. With
criminal charges nearly 8 percent of the black
officers were brought to trial compared to 11
percent for whites. Only 7 Puerto Ricans were
tried for departmental violations (35 percent)
but none (of 3) for criminal charges. Finally,
there were no significant differences in disposition
of civilian complaints for members of different
races.
Summary of Data Concerning the Processing of
Charges
* Fifteen percent of allegations of criminal
misconduct were brought to departmental
trial.
" One hundred forty-four allegations of cor-
ruption were recorded in eleven years against
nearly 2,000 officers. Twenty-three of these
were brought to departmental trial, with
five of them receiving penalties more severe
than a minor fine.
" One of the officers accused by civilians of
unnecessary force, abuse of authority, dis-
courteous behavior or ethnic slurs received
a penalty more severe than a verbal repri-
mand.
* Approximately 85 percent of alleged in-
stances of unnecessary force were either
dismissed or filed.
* No charges were brought to trial in any of
the 230 cases involving "protest summons."
" Fewer detectives than non-detectives were
brought to trial for departmental violations
or criminal charges.
" Detectives received less severe dispositions
for departmental violations, criminal charges
and civilian complaints than non-detectives.
" There were no meaningful differences among
the races (blacks, whites and Puerto Ricans)
in the proportions brought to trial..
* There were no meaningful differences in
final dispositions, regardless of the type of
complaint, for black, white and Puerto Rican
police officers.
* Very few serious punishments of major fine,
suspension or dismissal were imposed on the
officers charged with alleged misconduct
(less than 4 percent of the total).
CONCLUSIONS AN] RECO NDATIONS
The findings of this study neither confirm nor
deny allegations of widespread corruption in the
Department. Moreover, our data could not possi-
bly have been used to investigate the honesty
and integrity of any particular members of the
Department. Instead, the findings raise serious
doubts about the effectiveness of the Department's
routine operations for dealing with police miscon-
duct, especially criminal and civilian complaints.
On balance, they suggest that the Department's
formal disciplinary system is much better suited
for handling violations of internal rules and pro-
cedures that disrupt the normal and routine
operations of the force than for responding effec-
tively to complaints where individual citizens or
the community at large are victims. It is important
that the police, who are most clearly charged with
the maintenance of law and the defense of our
Constitution, should not tolerate any procedures
which leave room for the suspicion that policemen
are themselves virtually immune from the law.
Recommendations
"For this reason, the New York City Police
Department must make every effort to bring
about long-term reform of the police system of
justice and not only concentrate on investigations
to uncover current instances of misconduct. In
this connection, it is suggested that the Police
Department give some attention to the following
recommendations which are prompted by our
findings.
1. Existing management procedures must be
revised to assure that all allegations of misconduct
received by the Depdrtment are recorded by the
appropriate units.
Although it is not now possible to determine
what fraction of allegations are recorded, an
experiment could be undertaken in which
allegations are reported to 911, the police num-
ber, to local precincts, and to various other
units. Later, one could determine whether any
records of the experimental allegations exist.
Provision would have to be made so that no
officer would suffer as a result of this experiment.
2. Complainants should never be discouraged
from making complaints against police officers or
from pressing charges.
A follow-up interview of the complainant
would discourage police personnel from these
practices.
3. Appropriate criteria must be used in deciding
whether or not to bring a particular allegation to a
departmental trial.
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To arrive at these criteria we could examine
a sample of records and interview responsible
officials. Then we could determine whether
civilian investigators would have made the
same decision about bringing the case to trial.
For this purpose, a sample of allegations which
have already been processed by the police and
not brought to trial could be reinvestigated by
civilians. The objective of this investigation
would not be to place officers in jeopardy for a
second time but to determine whether the
large fraction of allegations not brought to
trial is explained by the lack of adequate
evidence.
4. Improve personnel management so that inves-
tigatory manpower is effectively utilized.
This would involve collecting data on how
much time is spent by investigators on various
activities, dividing the time spent investigating
allegations according to the type of each allega-
tion, its source, and its ultimate disposition.
The advantages and disadvantages of having
so many independent investigating units should
also 1e considered. Of interest here is the extent
to which records and activities are duplicated
in the separate units, the extent to which in-
formation is exchanged among them, and the
extent to which their responsibilities are clearly
distinguished.
S. Make certain that punishments given to officers
found guilty of misconduct are adequate.
Essentially, this is a matter of judgment for
the Police Commissioner and the public. Perhaps
a schedule of punishments for various classes
of offenses could be established so the an officer
would know what to expect for each violation.
This would not rule out the use of informal
sanctions which would be applied to officers
guilty of the most minor infractions.
6. Oficers on the force with numerous allegations
of misconduct should either be dismissed from the
force or given assignments where interaction with
citizens is minimized. The exact penalty would
depend on the nature of the offense and the proportion
of complaints substantiated.
It may be that the absence of a central file of
allegations against officers has prevented anyone,
prior to this study, from knowing that some
officers have had mote than one allegation a
year made against them. Such a failure in the
Department's information system could be
easily corrected.
At the same time each officer with multiple
allegations would have to be carefully adju-
dicated since a typical case could involve a
series of identical unsubstantiated complaints
by a single complainant.
7. The Department must show greater concern for
the interests of civilians in its disciplinary procedures.
Complainants should be notified of the prog-
ress of the investigation and the disposition of
the case. The Department should provide the
public with adequate information about the
progress of individual hearings and about its
disciplinary activities in general.
8. There must be a clear and appropriate division'
of responsibility between the internal police justice
system and the larger system of criminal justice.
The Department together with representa-
tives of the legal profession should establish
clear and simple standards to determine when
the District Attorney should be informed of the
facts of a case. In some cases of misconduct, it
would probably be better to have certain au-
thorities conduct the investigations instead of
the police. Involved here is the right of a society
to treat all persons charged with similar viola-
tions of the law in similar ways.
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